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It's a child's problem: we see objects as oriented correctly, both up-down and 
left -right, despite the fact that our retinal images of them are inverted in both 
respects; how can this be? The reason it is a child's problem is that the expla-
nation is so easy: there is no reason to think that the properties of our reti-
nal images should correspond to the content of the visual experiences they 
cause. Our retinal images are tiny; we see things as much larger. Our retinal 
images are uniformly the color of the retina; we see things as possessing a 
diversity of colors. None of these discrepancies, including the discrepancy in 
orientation, are unexpected, and so none genuinely problematic. 
And yet among those who have struggled with the problem are a startling 
number of the great minds of the early modern period: Kepler, Descartes, 
Malebranche, Molyneux, Newton, and Reid are among those who wrote about 
this issue. George Berkeley, who made greater strides in understanding vision 
than anyone before him, and whose work on vision set the stage for all fur-
ther work in both the psychology and philosophy of vision, describes the dis-
crepancy between, on the one hand, retinal image orientation and, on the 
other, the orientation objects are represented as having in visual experience 
a "mighty difficulty" (NTV 88) and the solution to "this knot ... the principal 
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point in the whole optic theory, the most difficult perhaps to comprehend, 
but the most deserving of our attention, and, when rightly understood the 
surest way to lead the mind into a thorough knowledge of the nature of 
vision" (TVV 52).l What is Berkeley on about? What difficult problem is con-
cealed beneath the surface of this child's problem? And what, exactly, do we 
learn about vision when we solve it? 
One way to make a problem out of a fact is to find a theory to which one 
is wedded that seems in conflict with it. The problem then becomes how to 
reconcile fact with theory. A particularly naOive theory of visual perception is 
in conflict with the fact of retinal image inversion: 
The Nai"ve Them),: S sees that object 0 has property P only if every 
part or feature of S crucial to the perception of the fact that 0 is 
P itself has P. 
That is, according to the Naive Theory, visual perception of properties is a 
matter of property-transmission. The object causes the retinal impression; 
the retinal impression causes nerve firings; those cause some sort of brain 
event; perhaps this causes an "idea" or some other mental item. According to 
the Naive Theory each of these states has to actually be like the object for us 
to see how the object is. 
Neither Berkeley nor his predecessors held the Naive Theory; probably 
nobody's ever held it in quite so naive a form. But many of Berkeley's prede-
cessors, notably Descartes and Malebranche, did hold a theory related to it. 
Following Margaret Atherton, we can call this widely held view "The Geometric 
Theory": 
The Geometric Theory: S sees that object 0 has property P only 
if every part of S crucial to the perception of the fact that 0 is P 
itself has some property necessarily connected to Po2 
According to the Geometric Theory, all the various states involved in the 
sequence from object to visual experience have to have a property, not iden-
tical to that of the object, but from which the seen property of the object 
could, in principle, be deduced. The Geometric Theory seems, anyway, to be 
capable of accommodating the fact of retinal image inversion: there is a sim-
ple geometrical transformation mapping the retinal image's orientation prop-
erties to those of the object that causes it. Thus, according to the Geometric 
Theory, when a person sees that an object has a particular property, he 
employs, probably unconsciously, this geometric transformation in order to 
extract the information about the object's actnal orientation from the ori-
entation of the retinal image. Descartes famously illustrated this by likening 
looking at an object to feeling it with crossed sticks: what one feels on one's 
right one takes to be on one's left and vice versa (and similarly for upper and 
lower).3 
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Berkeley's objections to the Geometric Theory are well known.4 The 
most important of them is this: Berkeley rejects any explanation of the role 
that a particular state plays in perception that appeals to features of that state 
that are not, themselves, accessible to consciousness. Since the Geometric 
Theory appeals to various features of the retinal image-notably its orienta-
tion and the geometric function mapping its orientation to that of the 
perceived object-that are not accessible to consciousness, it offers an unsat-
isfactory explanation of the role of the retinal image in perception. Notice, 
however, that this way of dispensing with the Geometric Theory's explana-
tion of the fact of retinal image inversion is no different from that through 
which Berkeley rejects the Geometric Theory's explanation of the perception 
of distance from the eye, for instance, and other properties perceived in vision. 
That is, the objection to the Geometric Theory that he raises in the course of 
his discussion of retinal image inversion is not special to that issue. Thus the 
inability of the Geometric Theory to adequately account for the role of the 
retinal image in perception can hardly be called "the principal point in the 
whole optic theory." Further, Berkeley's discussion of the issue does not end 
with his rejection of the Geometric Theory but continues on for more than 
twenty-five additional sections of NTY. Berkeley, then, doesn't consider the 
fact that retinal images are inverted to be of interest solely because of its per-
tinence to the Geometric Theory. He must think the issue has some other 
additional import. But what? 
The answer to this question will emerge in a somewhat roundabout way. 
In section I, I describe a problem that one encounters when trying to inter-
pret Berkeley's solution to the problem of the inverted retinal image in a way 
that remains consistent with his views on other closely related topics. Section 
II offers an alternative interpretation of the solution that solves the interpre-
tive problem of section 1. Section III uses this solution to the interpretive 
problem to answer the question with which we began (that is, "What's 
Berkeley on about?"). Once we see what Berkeley's solution to the problem 
of retinal image inversion really is, it becomes clear why he thinks the prob-
lem so important. It emerges, that is, that Berkeley has strong (although not 
decisive) reasons for thinking that the puzzlement that one might feel when 
encountering the fact of retinal image inversion can only be dispelled by 
accepting idealism. Overcoming the "mighty difficulty," then, requires a 
mighty leap. 
A couple preliminary points: First, I am assuming that Berkeley's talk of 
"visible" and "tangible" objects should be understood like so: a visible object 
is the intentional object of a visual experience; a tangible object is the inten-
tional object of a tactile experience. Berkeley holds, of course, that no visible 
object is identical to any tangible object. However, that claim is not built in to 
the definitions of the terms "tangible" and "visible object"-those definitions 
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allow the possibility that a person's visual and tactile experience have the same 
intentional object-but rather requires independent argument. Second, I am 
assuming throughout that for Berkeley terms that refer to objects are almost 
always systematically ambiguous in their reference between a visible and a 
tangible object. The term "that chair" does not specify whether the visible or 
tangible chair is being referred to. As it happens, the visible and tangible chair 
robustly co-occur in experience but, strictly speaking, the thing a perceiver 
encounters in touch and the thing encountered in vision are not identical. 
This ambiguity even affects such terms as "retinal image." The tangible reti-
nal image is the object that would be encountered by someone who was able 
to feel his retina affected by light; the visible retinal image is the object that 
would be encountered were he to employ some sort of tool for looking at his 
retina. Much of what Berkeley has to say about retinal image inversion 
requires keeping careful track of the distinction between visible and tangible 
objects. 
1. 
Berkeley introduces the problem of the inverted retinal image at NTV 88. 
The problem appears to be solved, once and for all, at NTV 114-although, 
as I will argue in section II, this is not, in fact, the final solution-where 
Berkeley writes, 
If we confine our thoughts to the proper objects of sight, the 
whole is plain and easy. The head is painted farthest from, and 
the feet nearest to, the visible earth; and so they appear to be. 
What is there strange or unaccountable in this? Let us suppose 
the pictures in the fund of the eye to be the immediate objects of 
the sight. The consequence is that things should appear in the 
same posture they are painted in; and is it not so? The head which 
is seen seems farthest from the earth which is seen; and the feet 
which are seen seem nearest to the earth, which is seen; and just 
so they are painted. (NTV 114) 
There is some controversy, on the basis of this passage, as to whether or not 
Berkeley takes the retinal image to be the "proper object of sight"; there is 
controversy, that is, over the question of whether or not a person seeing a 
man actually sees his own retinal image of the man.s However, nothing about 
the point that Berkeley is most concerned to make in this passage requires 
that extremely implausible claim. He thinks that the orientation properties 
of a visible object are determined by its relations to other visible objects and 
he draws a lesson from this claim. The lesson can be understood by imagin-
ing that two people have precisely the same visual experience except that the 
first's visual field is inverted both horizontally and vertically with respect to 
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the second's. Berkeley is claiming that the objects that each are encountering 
have all of the same orientation properties. Berkeley makes the rhetorical 
error of asking one to engage in this thought experiment by imagining a per-
son whose visuall1eld is another's retinal image. But his point, nevertheless, 
is clear: if the inversion of one's visual field does not affect the orientation 
properties one sees, then there is no meaningful sense in which the retinal 
image is inverted and so there is no problem to solve. 
A few sections earlier, at NTV Ill, Berkeley offers the crucial premise in 
NTV 114's argument. He writes, 
[TJhe objects of sight and touch make, if I may so say, two sets 
of ideas which are widely different from each other. 1b objects of 
either kind we indifferently attribute the terms high and low, right 
and left, and suchlike, denoting the position or situation of things: 
but then we must well observe that the position of any object is 
determined with respect only to objects of the same sense. (NTV 
Ill) 
Berkeley is making a negative claim and a positive claim. The negative claim 
is that objects of neither sense modality possess orientation properties with respect 
to objects of the other sense modality. The positive claim made in the section 
is that objects possess orientation properties relative to objects oIthe same sense 
modality as themselves. The argument of NT V 114 can be construed in such 
a way that both the negative and the positive claim are required to support 
it. So understood, Berkeley is arguing first, on the basis of the negative claim, 
that the tangible retinal image can't have any orientation properties with 
respect to the intentional object of the visual experience of the person with 
that retinal image (that is, the object the person sees), and so can't be inverted 
with respect to it; and, at the same time, to be arguing, on the basis of the 
positive claim, that the visible retinal image is oriented with respect to the 
visible object encountered, but is not inverted with respect to it. It is in sup-
port of this last claim, one might think, that Berkeley notes that "[ tl he head 
which is seen seems farthest from the earth which is seen; and the feet which 
are seen seem nearest to the earth, which is seen; and just so they are painted" 
(NTV 114). (Momentarily it will be argued that despite the fact Berkeley notes 
here, there is little reason to think that the visible retinal image is not inverted 
with respect to the visible object.) Still, if these claims are true, Berkeley, so 
construed, has solved the problem, for there is no problem with the orienta-
tion of the retinal image if there is no sense in which it is inverted with respect 
to the visible object that the person sees. 
However, there is a way of construing the argument offered at NTV 114 
under which it is only the negative claim, and not the positive claim, which 
is required as a premise. Imagine that visible objects have no orientation prop-
erties at all, not even properties arising from their relations to other visible 
objects; that is, imagine that the positive claim is false. Again, there are two 
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cases: the term "retinal image," as employed by someone puzzled by its ori-
entation, either refers to a visible or a tangible object. If the term refers to the 
visible retinal image, then it refers to something that can't be inverted with 
respect to the visible object the perceiver encounters because it can't be 
inverted with respect to any other object; if it refers to the tangible retinal 
image, then it refers to something that can't be inverted with respect to the 
visible object encountered, for it can be inverted only with respect to some 
other tangible object. Either way, there is no meaningful problem of the 
inverted retinal image for there is no sense in which the sentence "My retinal 
image is inverted relative to what I see" is true. So, we can interpret NTV 114 
in such a way that Berkeley doesn't need to claim that visible objects have ori-
entation properties with respect to other visible objects, as he does claim in 
NTV Ill, so long as he also accepts that visible objects lack orientation prop-
erties entirely. 
The reason this point is important is that when one looks back to a much 
earlier section of NTV it appears that Berkeley is committing himself to the 
denial of the positive claim of NTV 111; that is, he seems to deny that visi-
ble objects are oriented with respect to one another. Berkeley writes, 
[A man born blind], if we suppose him made to see, would not 
at first sight think anything he saw was high or low, erect or 
inverted ... The ohjects to which he had hitherto heen used to 
apply the terms lip and dowl1, high and low, were such only as 
affected or were some way perceived by his touch: but the proper 
objects of vision make a new set of ideas, perfectly distinct and 
different from the former, and which can in no sort make them-
selves perceived by touch. There is, therefore, nothing at all that 
could induce him to think those terms applicable to them: nor 
would he ever think it till such time as he had observed their con-
nexion with tangible objects, and the same prejudice hegan to 
insinuate itself into his understanding, which from their infancy 
had grown up in the understandings of other men. (NTV 95) 
Assuming that the man born blind, when made to see, encounters the "proper 
objects of vision," and assuming that the positive claim made at NTV III is 
to be taken at face value, it would seem to follow that on being made to see 
the man born blind would be able to recognize a range of orientation prop-
erties by comparing visible objects with other visible objects. After all, if vis-
ible objects have orientation properties with respect to one another, then why 
shouldn't the man notice immediately when made to see that, for instance, 
one of his twin sons is standing on his head and the other is inverted with 
respect to him. But Berkeley seems, in this passage, to deny that the man born 
blind has this capacity. Only from correlating visual experiences with tactile, 
and thus insinuating in himself the prejudice of those born with sight, would 
the man recognize visible objects to have any orientation properties at all. 
That is, what Berkeley seems to be claiming is that visible objects lack orien-
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tat ion properties intrinsically, but inherit them from the tangible objects with 
which we find them to be correlated. In fact, Berkeley makes a big point of 
this, going on to offer accounts of two different mechanisms through which 
the man born blind, when made to see, would come to assign orientation 
properties to visible objects after having tactile experience in conjunction 
with visual (NTV 97-99). He thinks that such a person would come to assign 
the property of being above him to a visible object if its movement to the 
center of the man's visual field is correlated with the feeling of turning his 
head or eyes upward; and he holds that we could come to assign the orien-
tation properties to a visible object of the tangible object with which we come 
to find it to be associated.6 
Once we note the inconsistency between the positive claim of NTV III 
(namely, that visible objects have orientation properties with respect to other 
visible objects) and the claim of NTV 95 (namely, that visible objects have 
orientation properties only secondarily, by virtue of their correlations with 
tangible objects), then, together with the fact that NTV Ill's positive claim 
need not be construed to playa role in Berkeley's official solution to the prob-
lem of retinal image inversion at NTV 114, there is a strong temptation to 
think that Berkeley is simply slipping on his official view in NTV 111. That 
is, there is a temptation to say that in his considered moments, Berkeley thinks 
that visible objects have no orientation properties at all, not even with respect 
to other visible objects. 
In fact, there is yet another reason to take this line: if Berkeley allows that 
visible objects have orientation properties with respect to other visible objects, 
then his solution to the problem of retinal image inversion is seriously incom-
plete, for the visible retinal image-the object one encounters when looking 
into an eye with the right tools-is inverted with respect to the visible object 
encountered by the person whose retinal image it is; and this can seem quite 
puzzling. To see the point, consider a thought experiment: Imagine that we 
set up a special camera that looks into a subject's right eye and projects his 
retinal image onto a screen. And imagine that we place that screen in front 
of the subject's left eye, and in such a way that it cannot be seen by his right 
and so that it occupies the entire visual field of his left eye. And, similarly, 
imagine that his left eye cannot see the objects placed before his right. The 
subject, we can imagine, experiences something like a "split screen": on the 
right he sees an object, an arrow say, and on the left he sees his own right eye's 
retinal image of that arrow. Let's add something else: imagine that the sub-
ject also feels his right eye's retinal image (maybe we give him a special drug 
to make this happen). For him, when looking at an arrow he has the feeling 
in his right eye similar to that that a normal person has when a cold, arrow-
shaped object is pressed against his arm. To put it in Berkeley's terms, the 
man is encountering three objects: (a) a visible arrow (which he sees with his 
right eye), (b) a visible retinal image of an arrow (which he sees with his left 
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eye), and (c) a tangible retinal image of an arrow (which he feels behind his 
right eyelid). 
Now let's accept that there is no fact of the matter about the direction of 
arrows (a) or (b) when either is compared only with arrow (c); let's accept, 
that is, the negative claim of NTV Ill. (a) and (b) are both visible objects, 
and (c) is a tangible object, and objects don't, let's assume, have orientation 
properties with respect to objects of other sense modalities. Still, if visible 
objects do have orientation properties within their proper sense modality-
the positive claim of NT V Ill-then it is fair to say that arrow (a) is inverted 
with respect to arrow (b), and vice versa. If the subject in our experiment 
thinks this an extraordinary and puzzling fact-which he might, especially 
when he discovers, for instance, that the orientation of the object he encoun-
ters with his left eye changes when the orientation of that which he encoun-
ters with his right changes-his puzzlement can't be dispelled by charging 
him with making an illicit visible-tangible comparison, since he's making no 
such comparison. Noting that objects lack orientation properties with respect 
to objects of other sense modalities simply won't quell his puzzlement, for 
he's not comparing objects across sense modalities at all. So, it seems, if 
Berkeley allows that visible objects have orientation properties with respect 
to other visible objects, the problem of retinal image inversion simply does-
n't admit of the solution he seems most naturally to be giving it in NTV 114. 
The solution there seems to suggest that our puzzlement about the orienta-
tion of the retinal image will be dispelled by noting the nature of the objects 
with respect to which visible objects are oriented. But the man in our exam-
pie is no less puzzled after noting this, so long as he can see that his retinal 
image is oriented oppositely from the visible object he encounters. Again, it 
seems, charity requires that we take Berkeley's considered view to be that vis-
ible objects lack orientation properties even with respect to other visible 
objects, despite what he says at NTV Ill. If we construe his view this way, 
then we can say that (a) and (b) are not only not oriented with respect to (c), 
but neither is oriented with respect to the other. This is a peculiar thing to 
say-it certainly seems that the man could truly say that the two arrows are 
pointing in opposite directions-but, at least, it saves Berkeley from incon-
sistency. 
However, Berkeley is under independent and powerful pressure to make 
the claim that visible objects have orientation properties with respect to other 
visible objects, the positive claim of NTV Ill. The pressure arises from the 
fact that Berkeley holds that all visible objects, including the "proper objects 
of vision," have visible magnitude. In drawing the distinction between the 
primary and the secondary objects of sight, for instance, he writes, 
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[Tlhere are two sorts of objects apprehended by the eye, the one 
primarily and immediately, the other secondarily and by inter-
vention of the former. Those of the first sort neither are, nor 
appear to be, without the mind, or at any distance off; they may 
indeed grow greater or smaller, more confused, or more clear, or 
more faint, but they do not, cannot approach or recede from us. 
(NTV 50, my emphasis) 
It is the primary objects of vision-vision's "proper objects" -that Berkeley 
takes to grow larger and smaller, and so he must take the primary objects of 
vision to have visible size. In fact, Berkeley goes on to explain that a visible 
object's visible size is measured by the number of minima visibilia out of 
which it is constructed (cf. NTV 79-86). But even if we don't accept that par-
ticular theory of the nature of visible size, we must still accept that visible 
objects do, indeed, have visible size. The reason this is important for our pur-
poses is that, so long as there are distinctions among visible objects, the fact 
that visible objects have visible size independently of association with tangi-
ble objects implies that visible objects have a range of orientation properties 
with respect to one another. A visible object is visibly above another if it is 
visibly closer to the visible earth than the other, for instance. In fact, in one 
expression of his official solution to the problem of retinal image inversion, 
Berkeley appeals to the reduction of a range of orientation properties to mag-
nitudes relative to a fixed object: 
The head, which is painted nearest the earth, seems to be farthest 
from it: and on the other hand the feet, which are painted far-
thest from the earth, are thought nearest to it. Herein lies the dif-
ficulty, which vanishes if we express the thing more clearly and 
free from ambiguity, thus: how comes it that to the eye the visi-
ble head which is nearest the tangible earth seems farthest from 
the earth, and the visible feet which are farthest from the tangi-
be earth seem nearest the earth? The question being thus pro-
posed, who sees not the difficulty is founded on a supposition 
that the eye, or visive faculty, or rather the soul by means thereof, 
should judge of the situation of visible objects with reference to 
their distance from the tangible earth? (NTV 113) 
The claim, of course, is that only a person who makes illicit visible-tangible 
comparisons will be troubled by the fact of retinal image inversion. But 
putting that point aside, it is clear from this passage that Berkeley thinks that 
(many, if not all) facts about orientation can be reduced to facts about dis-
tance from the earth. Since there is a visible earth and there is visible distance, 
there are facts about visible orientation. Thus, visible objects have orienta-
tion properties with respect to one another. Berkeley, then, seems to be under 
pressure both to accept and to reject the positive claim of NTV Ill. 
To summarize the interpretive problem just described, consider the fol-
lowing three lines of thought, each of which represents a solution to the prob-
lem of retinal image inversion: 
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First solution: 
(1) Visible objects are not oriented with respect to tangible objects, 
or vice versa. 
(2) There is nothing puzzling about retinal image inversion unless 
one imagines that a visible object is oriented in some way with 
respect to a tangible or vice versa. 
:. There is nothing puzzling about retinal image inversion.i 
Second solution: 
(1') Visible objects are not oriented with respect to tangible objects, 
or vice versa. 
(2') Visible objects are not oriented with respect to one another. 
(3') The tangible retinal image is neither inverted nor erect with 
respect to the visible object seen by the person with that retinal 
image. (from (1'» 
(4') The visible retinal image is neither inverted nor erect with respect 
to the visible object seen by the person with that retinal image. 
(from (2'») 
(5') There is nothing puzzling about retinal image inversion unless 
either the tangible or visible retinal image is inverted with respect 
to the visible object seen by the person with that retinal image. 
:. There is nothing puzzling about retinal image inversion.8 
Third solution: 
(I") Visible objects are not oriented with respect to tangible objects, 
or vice versa. 
(2") Visible objects are oriented with respect to one another. 
(3") The tangible retinal image is neither inverted nor erect with 
respect to the visible object seen by the person with that retinal 
image. (from (I "» 
(4") The visible retinal image is erect with respect to the visible object 
seen by the person with that retinal image.9 
(5") There is nothing puzzling about retinal image inversion unless 
either the tangible or visible retinal image is inverted with respect 
to the visible object seen by the person with that retinal image. 
:. There is nothing puzzling about retinal image inversion. lO 
We've reached the following results: In response to the first solution, one 
might wonder why (2) is thought true. The thought experiment above, in 
which a person sees both a visible object and his own retinal image of it, seems 
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to show that one could get rather puzzled about the fact of retinal image 
inversion just by confining one's comparisons of orientation to visible objects. 
The best way to neutralize this worry is to abandon the first solution in favor 
of the second, and thus deny that visible objects have any orientation prop-
erties at all, even relative to one another. The second solution is consonant 
with what Berkeley says at NTV 95, where he denies that the man born blind 
and made to see finds the visible objects he encounters to be oriented at all. 
However, in addition to denying what he seems to explicitly say in NTV Ill, 
and to thereby saddle himself with an intuitively implausible view, if Berkeley 
were to take this route, he would also have to abandon his view that visible 
objects have visible magnitude, a view that is deeply entrenched in his the-
ory of vision. Another possibility is to offer the third solution. However, if 
Berkeley were to take this route, he would have to abandon his view that the 
blind man made to see finds the visible objects he encounters to lack orien-
tation properties entirely. The question, then, is whether or not there is any 
way for Berkeley to consistently say all that he does say. As we'll see in the 
next section, the answer is "yes" for Berkeley's solution to the problem is dif-
ferent from any of the three solutions just discussed. 
II. 
If Berkeley is offering the following solution to the problem-which, I'll argue, 
he is-then the interpretive difficulty described can be resolved: 
Fourth solution: 
(1"') There is nothing puzzling about the orientation of either the vis-
ible or tangible retinal image unless (i) both that retinal image 
and some visible object that co-occurs with it accurately repre-
sent some third object's orientation, and (ii) the retinal image is 
inverted relative to this co-occurring visible object. 
(2"') No tangible object has any orientation property relative to any 
visible object. 
(3''') :. There is nothing puzzling about the orientation of the tangi-
ble retinal image. (since so construed, given (2"'), clause (ii) of 
(1"') cannot be fulfilled) 
(4"') If the visible retinal image and the visible object seen by the per-
son who has that retinal image represent anything at all, they do 
not represent the same thing. 
(5"') :. There is nothing puzzling about the orientation of the visible 
retinal image. (since so construed, given (4"'), clause (i) of (1"') 
cannot be fulfilled) 
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:. There is nothing puzzling about the orientation of either the tangi-
ble or visible retinal image. 
The driving idea of this fourth solution, then, is this: The mere fact that 
the retinal image is oriented a certain way is not, in itself, problematic. 
Imagine, for instance, that you had ten coffee cups on a table, all but one of 
which was inverted. Would this be puzzling? Of course not. The retinal image's 
orientation is only puzzling because of something about the representational 
role that we ordinarily take the retinal image to play. However, there is noth-
ing puzzling, even, about a representation being inverted with respect to what 
it represents because there is no reason to expect representations to have the 
same properties as what they represent; an image in a mirror, for instance, 
accurately represents the orientation of what it depicts, despite the fact that 
it is oriented oppositely. To make a puzzle we still need more: we need the 
retinal image to be inverted with respect to another accurate representation 
of the same object. ll This is what (1"') says. The solution to the problem is 
to show that the visible object with respect to which the (visible) retinal image 
can be meaningfully said to be inverted does not represent the same thing as 
that retinal image. 
To put the point of the fourth solution another way: Consider the sort 
of commonsensical position that someone like Locke might advocate: When 
we see objects we encounter perspectival visual representations of those 
objects. However, we also learn from some rudimentary study of anatomy 
and optics that the pattern of light on the retina is inverted with respect to 
those objects, and also that that pattern is determinative of much about the 
features of the perspectival visual representations with which we find our-
selves. The puzzle is to explain how two things-the retinal image and the 
perspectival visual representation-could both accurately represent the same 
object and yet represent it as having different and incompatible properties. 
The fourth solution dissolves the problem by claiming that one of the objects 
the term "retinal image" refers to, namely the tangible retinal image, is not 
inverted with respect to the perspectival visual representation; and the other, 
namely the visible retinal image, does not represent the same thing as the per-
spectival visual representation. Either way, then, there's no genuine problem 
to solve. 
If Berkeley has this solution in mind, then the interpretive problem 
described in section I would be dissolved. Berkeley's discussion at NTV 95 
could be taken quite literally: the visible objects encountered by the man born 
blind who is made to see lack orientation properties of the sort that generate 
the puzzle because they are not signs of anything else. They become signs of 
tangible objects as the man moves his head, eyes, and body and learns to cor-
relate visible objects with variously oriented tangible objects, thereby causing 
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those visible objects to be signs of the tangible. However, this doesn't imply 
that they lack orientation properties entirely: they are oriented relative to 
other visible objects, just as Berkeley says at NTV 111; it's just that these ori-
entation properties aren't of any relevance to the puzzle since they aren't ori-
entation properties of signs relative to other co-signifying signs. When the 
man born blind is made to see, he finds the visible objects he encounters to 
be oriented with respect to one another. But, he remains unequipped to be 
puzzled by the fact of retinal image inversion, for none of the visible objects 
that he encounters function, for him, as representations of anything else. They 
inherit their representational role from the correlation of tangible and visi-
ble objects, and (perhaps) of visible objects with one another, correlations 
that, for this man, have not yet been created. 
Further, the fourth solution solves the problem of the inverted retinal 
image even if the retinal image is conceived entirely as a visible object, in the 
manner of our thought experiment in section I. The man who sees both his 
own retinal image and the visible object is puzzled by their relative orienta-
tions only if he thinks of the visible retinal image of the arrow and the visi-
ble arrow to be signs of the same thing. In that case, he's unsure as to how 
the object represented is actually oriented: one visible object seems to be 
telling him one thing, another another. The represented object, he might 
think, can't be oriented both as shown by the visible retinal image of the arrow 
and as shown by the visible arrow. The fourth solution can help the man to 
relieve his puzzlement by noting that, in fact, the visible arrow and the visi-
ble retinal image of the arrow do not represent the same thing. If the visible 
retinal image represents anything at all, it represents either the visible arrow 
or the tangible retinal image; but if the visible arrow represents anything at 
all, it certainly doesn't represent either itself or the tangible retinal image. The 
two visible objects are oriented oppositely with respect to one another, of 
course, but this fact is not puzzling without the conception of them as signs 
of the same thing. 
So, if Berkeley has the fourth solution in mind, then our interpretive 
problem is solved. But what evidence is there to think that he does? Start by 
considering what Berkeley says in a series of difficult sections, NTV 116-19, 
the importance of which has not been appreciated by commentators. Berkeley 
begins NTV 116 as follows, 
[W] hat greatly contributes to make us mistake in this matter is 
that when we think of the pictures in the fund of the eye, we 
imagine ourselves looking on the fund of another's eye, or 
another looking on the fund of our own eye, and beholding the 
pictures painted thereon. Suppose two eyes A J nd B: A from some 
distance looking on the pictures in B sees them inverted, and for 
that reason concludes they are inverted in B: but this is wrong. 
(NTV 111l) 
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What B Sees What A Sees 





FIGURE 1: X is a visible person. VBIX) is eye B's visible retillal illlage of X VA(X) is 
eye A's visible retillol inzage of X VA (ViX)) is A's visible retir/al image of B's visible 
retinal image of X 
The panels labeled "What B Sees" and "What A Sees" in Figure 1 illustrate 
what Berkeley has so far described: B sees a visible person (X) and A sees both 
that visible person and B's visible retinal image of that person (VB (X)). What, 
exactly, is it wrong for A to conclude, according to Berkeley? Evidently, A is 
wrong to think that "the pictures in B ... are inverted in B." But the two most 
natural interpretations of this claim can't be what Berkeley has in mind. 
Berkeley seems to be claiming that "in B" the retinal image is not actually 
inverted. Interpreted as the claim that B's visible retinal image (V B(X)), which 
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is one of the visible objects that A encounters, is not inverted, the claim is 
false: VB(X) is inverted relative to X, as A can see. Interpreted as a claim about 
B,s tangible retinal image, the claim is also false: were A to somehow feel B,s 
retinal image he would find it, also, to be inverted relative to the tangible per-
son. So what does Berkeley think it wrong for A to conclude?12 The passage 
continues: 
There are projected in little on the bottom of A the images of the 
pictures of, suppose, man, earth, etc., which are painted on 13. 
And besides these the eye B itself, and the objects which environ 
it, together with another earth, are projected in a larger size on 
A. Now, by the eye A these larger images are deemed the true 
objects, and the lesser only pictures in miniature. And it is with 
respect to those greater images that it determines the situation 
of the smaller images: so that comparing the little man with the 
great earth, A judges him inverted, or that the feet are farthest 
from and the head nearest to the great earth. Whereas, if A com-
pares the little man with the little earth, then he will appear erect, 
i.e. his head shall seem farthest from, and his feet nearest to, the 
little earth. (NTV 116) 
Berkeley notes that A wouldn't be puzzled if he didn't compare X's orienta-
tion to V B(X)'S; those are the only two visible objects A encounters that are 
inverted with respect to one another. If A were to compare Vll(X) only to 
other visible objects that he sees inside B's eye, he would not think that V B(X) 
was inverted. Further, Berkeley adds that A takes X to be the "true object" and 
takes V s(X) to be a representation of it, although he has not yet explained 
what role that presumption plays in generating J\s puzzlement. Further, we 
have yet to be illuminated as to what Berkeley means in claiming that A is 
wrong to think that B's retinal image is inverted "in B." 
The passage continues: 
But we must consider that 13 does not see two earths as A does: 
it sees only what is represented by the little pictures in A, and con-
sequently shall judge the man erect. For, in truth, the man in B 
is not inverted, for there the feet are next the earth; but it is the 
representation of it in A which is inverted, for there the head of 
the representation of the picture of the man in B is next the earth, 
and the feet farthest from the earth, meaning the earth which is 
without the representation of the pictures in B. For if you take 
the little images of the pictures in B, and consider them by them-
selves, and with respect only to one another, they are all erect and 
in their natural posture. (NTV 116) 
What is the importance of the claim that "B does not see two earths as A 
does?" If Berkeley's solution to the problem of the inverted retinal image were 
merely to assert that people don't see their retinal images, and so don't notice 
the discrepancy in orientation between visible objects and signs of them, he 
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could have said this much earlier and saved his reader this very long discus-
sion. Rather, Berkeley is relying on the following principle: An object (visi-
ble or tangible) serves as a representation for a particular perceiver, only if 
the perceiver perceives it. (Below some textual support is given for thinking 
that Berkeley has this principle in mind here.) From this principle Berkeley 
is able to conclude that B's visible retinal image (V B(X» is not, for B, a sign 
of anything else, since if that were so, B would have to see his own retinal 
image, which he does not. But if it is not a sign of anything else, it cannot be 
inverted in any way which could be thought problematic. So, the person who 
thinks that "the pictures in B ... are inverted in B" thinks that B's visible reti-
nal image serves as a sign for B of some other object with respect to which it 
is inverted. But this is wrong, just as Berkeley says, since B's visible retinal 
image is not, for B, a sign of anything at all. B's tangible retinal image could 
be considered as a sign, for B, of something else (perhaps B feels his retinal 
image, however slightly). But B can't have an inversion problem there, since 
tangible objects aren't oriented with respect to visible. This is why Berkeley 
immediately reminds us of the heterogeneity of the visible and the tangible, 
a claim argued for earlier in the NTV: 
Farther, there lies a mistake in our imagining that the pictures of 
external objects are painted on the bottom of the eye. It hath been 
shown there is no resemblance between the ideas of sight and 
things tangible. It hath likewise been demonstrated that the 
proper objects of sight do not exist without the mind. Whence it 
clearly follows that the pictures painted on the bottom of the eye 
are not the pictures of external objects. Let anyone consult his 
own thoughts, and then say what affinity, what likeness there is 
between that certain variety and disposition of colours which 
constitute the visible man, or picture of a man, and that other 
combination of far different ideas, sensible by touch, which com-
pose the tangible man. (NTV 117) 
However, it is a mere accident of biology that person B in Berkeley's 
example does not encounter his own visible retinal image (V B(X», and so it 
is a mere accident of biology that that does not function, for him, as a rep-
resentation of anything else. Both the man, A, in Berkeley's example and the 
man in our earlier example who sees both his visible retinal image of an arrow 
and the visible arrow, encounters a visible retinal image that, it would seem, 
functions as a sign for him of another visible object. For A, in other words, 
B's visible retinal image (VB (X» is a sign of another object (X) and is inverted 
with respect to it. Shouldn't A find that strange? No, because for there to be 
a puzzle about the inverted retinal image there must not be one, but two rep-
resentations of a single object which are inverted with respect to one another. 
But A sees only one sign-B's visible retinal image-and one true object that 
it represents and so doesn't have the materials to make a puzzle. It is as though 
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A sees a person and that person's reflection in a mirror; there's nothing puz-
zling about that. In fact, even if A considers X to represent something else-
he might take X to be a perspectival visual representation of the "real" man, 
for instance-A would still lack the materials to make a puzzle, for whatever 
X is taken by A to represent, it won't be taken by him to represent itselt~ and 
so it won't be taken by him to represent the same thing as he takes V B(X) to 
represent (namely X). In fact, in the very next section, we find Berkeley mak-
ing exactly this point: 
[Iln the forementioned instance the eye A takes the little images, 
included within the representation of the other eye B, to be pic-
tures or copies, whereof the archetypes are not things existing 
without, but the larger pictures projected on its own fund: and 
which by A are not thought pictures, but the originals, or true 
things themselves. Though if we su ppose a third eye C from a 
due distance to behold the fund of A, then indeed the things pro-
jected thereon shall, to C, seem pictures or images in the same 
sense that those projected OIl B do to A. (NTV 118) 
So long as we confine consideration to visible objects, A doesn't conceive X 
to be a representation of anything else-if he conceives of it as a representa-
tion at all, he takes it to represent a "real," or tangible, object-and so lacks 
the tools with which to become legitimately puzzled. Even if a third person 
were to represent what is going on in A, there would still not be any person 
who sees two signs of one visible object, themselves oppositely oriented vis-
ible objects. Referring to the panel labeled "What C Sees" in Figure I, it seems 
that C sees four visible objects: a "true" object (X), two representations of it 
(V B(X) and V A (X)), and a representation of the first of these representations 
(VA (V B(X))), However, since V B(X) and VA (X) are oriented in the same way, 
and since VA (VB(X)) is not a representation of X but, instead, of V Il(X), there 
is nothing to become puzzled about. 
Couldn't a person see three visible objects two of which are oppositely 
oriented and both of which represent the third? Imagine, for instance, that a 
subject wears a pair of glasses one lens of which inverts the image that passes 
through it and the other of which is clear glass. The subject has the usual reti-
nal image in, say, his left eye, and an image in his right eye that is oppositely 
oriented. Imagine that this person has gotten used to his predicament so that 
he sees what he sees just as you and I do. Now imagine that we have before 
us the visible retinal image in the subject's left eye, the visible retinal image 
in his right, and the visible man that the subject sees. If we take each of the 
subject's retinal images to represent the visible man, then we encounter two 
representations of the man that are oppositely oriented. This is puzzling and 
it isn't clear that the puzzlement can be easily dispelled. But, notice, this exam-
ple does not conflict with, but rather confirms, Berkeley's point of view as 
represented in the fourth solution. Unlike the usual case, this case should seem 
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puzzling-maybe so puzzling, even, as to be impossible. To make sense of 
how the subject can see the man before him as you and I do we have to imag-
ine that either one of his visible retinal images does not, in fact, represent the 
man accurately, or that one of the visible retinal images plays no role in gen-
erating the subject's visual experience of the man and, thus, does not repre-
sent the visible man at all.13 Either way, the puzzle of retinal image orientation 
is puzzling for just the reasons that Berkeley takes it to be and the puzzlement 
can be dispelled only in one of the two ways that he has in mind. 
Berkeley ends the sections under discussion with the following remark: 
Rightly to conceive this point we must carefully distinguish 
between the ideas of sight and touch, between the visible and tan-
gible eye; for certainly on the tangible eye nothing either is or 
seems to be painted. Again, the visible eye, as well as all other vis-
ible objects, hath been shown to exist only in the mind, which 
perceiving its own ideas, and comparing them together, calls some 
pictures in respect of others. (NTV 119) 
Here Berkeley seems to emphasize the mind-dependence of all visible objects, 
and particularly the visible eye. This is a bit odd since a person who is puz-
zled about the inverted retinal image does not seem to be making the "mis-
take" of thinking that the eye, particularly the visible eye, lies "outside" the 
mind. Berkeley doesn't appear to have ever relied on the claim that visible 
objects are mind-dependent in order to dissolve the puzzle of the inverted 
retinal image; it seems that we could accept his solution while holding on to 
the view that all the objects under discussion are mind-independent. So, why 
does he emphasize the point here? Or, rather, what point is Berkeley really 
making? Berkeley's point here is that only entities that are perceived can func-
tion as signs. Only by being "compared" with something else can an object 
be a sign of that other thing, and only by being perceived can one thing be 
compared with another. This point, unlike the mere fact that visible objects 
are mind-dependent, is of immediate relevance to his dissolution of the prob-
lem of the inverted retinal image. After all, this is a statement of the princi-
ple invoked earlier in our discussion in support of the point that B's visible 
retinal image cannot serve, for B, as a sign of anything else: since B doesn't 
perceive his visible retinal image he can't be in position to "compare" it to 
anything else, and so it cannot function as a sign, for him, of anything else. 
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Return, momentarily, to NTV 114: 
If we confine our thoughts to the proper objects of sight, the 
whole is plain and easy. The head is painted farthest from, and 
the feet nearest to, the visihle earth; and so they appear to be. 
What is there strange or unaccountable in this? Let us suppose 
the pictures in the fund of the eye to be the immediate objects of 
the sight. The consequence is that things should appear in the 
same posture they are painted in; and is it not so? The head which 
is seen seems farthest from the earth which is seen; and the feet 
which are seen seem nearest to the earth, which is seen; and just 
so they are painted. (NTV 114) 
Part of what so naturally leads the reader to attribute to Berkeley one of the 
first three solutions to the problem of retinal image inversion, and thus to 
encounter the interpretive problem described in section I, is the appearance 
that NTV 114 contains Berkeley's full solution to the problem. But we are 
now in position to see that that is not what NTV 114 offers. The point of the 
section, as noted before, is that two people who encounter visible objects that 
are inverted with respect to one another won't, ipso facto, see things differ-
ently from one another. It is tempting to see this as significant because it shows 
that the retinal image is not, actually, inverted with respect to the visible object 
that a person encounters. But this is not Berkeley's real point. Rather, his point 
is that for there to be a problem about the retinal image's inversion, we need 
to have some other visible object to compare it to that is supposed to play the 
same representational role as that we take the retinal image to play. There is 
nothing "unaccountable" about the orientation of the retinal image even 
when it is construed as a visible object if we look only at the orientation prop-
erties it possesses by virtue of relations among its parts. It is in the sections 
following, the sections we have just considered, that Berkeley makes dear 
what kinds of comparisons are required to create a problem: to become puz-
zled, we have to consider the retinal image as an accurate representation and 
compare it with another oppositely oriented visible object that we take to 
accurately represent the same thing. 
Berkeley seems to have realized that he hadn't presented his solution to 
the problem of the inverted retinal image with his usual crystal clarity. 
Immediately following the sections just discussed, he apologizes: 
In treating of these things the use of language is apt to occasion 
some obscurity and confusion, and create in us wrong ideas; for 
language being accommodated to the common notions and prej-
udices of men, it is scarce possible to deliver the naked and pre-
cise truth without great circumlocution, impropriety, and (to an 
unwary reader) seeming contradictions; I do therefore once for 
all desire whoever shall think it worth his while to understand 
what I have written concerning vision, that he would not stick in 
this or that phrase, or manner of expression, but candidly collect 
my meaning from the whole sum and tenor of my discourse. 
(NTV 120) 
More than twenty years later, he took another run at an explanation of the 
problem in Theory of Vision Vindicated, and reflection on what he says there 
supports the contention that he is offering the fourth solution. Immediately 
before introducing the problem, he writes, 
Those immediate objects whose mutual respect and order come 
to be expressed by terms relative to tangible place [that is, visible 
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objects J, being connected with the real objects of touch, what we 
say and judge of the one, we say and judge of the other, transfer-
ring our thought or apprehension from the signs to the things 
signified: as it is usual, in hearing or reading a discourse, to over-
look the sounds or letters, and instantly pass on to the meaning. 
(TW 48) 
Berkeley's primary concern here is to explain why we take visible objects to 
occupy the locations of those tangible objects with which they are correlated. 
The explanation that he offers appeals to our mistaken tendency to ascribe 
properties to signs that are actually possessed by the things they signify. It is 
the same mistake, he goes on to say, that leads one to find the orientation of 
the retinal image puzzling. It's instructive, first, to see how he describes the 
problem here: 
But there is a great difficulty relating to the situation of objects, 
as perceived by sight. For, since the pencils of rays issuing from 
any luminous object do, after their passage through the pupil, 
and their refraction by the crystalline, delineate inverted pictures 
in the retina, which pictures are supposed the immediate proper 
objects of sight, how comes it to pass that the objects whereof the 
pictures are thus inverted do yet seem erect and in their natural 
situation? For the objects not being perceived otherwise than by 
their pictures, it should follow that, as these are inverted, those 
should seem so too. (TW 49) 
Berkeley puts the problem as one of discrepancy between the orientation of 
the retinal image on the one hand, and the orientation the object seems to 
have, on the other. That is, he sets up the problem as one involving two modes 
of representation of a single object: the object is represented by the retinal 
image, and it is represented in appearance, or in the way it seems; that is, it 
is represented by a visible object. The problem arises from thinking that the 
object is represented as oriented one way by the retinal image and another 
by its appearance or corresponding visible object. Berkeley then solves the 
problem by demonstrating that it is a mistake to think that these two signs, 
the retinal image and the visible object, are legitimately compared with each 
other. He claims that the retinal image is a tangible object and goes on to 
write: 
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These tangible images on the retina have some resemblance unto 
the tangible objects from which the rays go forth; and in respect 
of those objects I grant they are inverted. But then I deny that 
they are, or can be, the proper immediate objects of sight. This, 
indeed, is vulgarly supposed by the writers of optics: but it is a 
vulgar error: which being removed the forementioned difficulty 
is removed with it, and admits a just and full solution, being 
shewn to arise from a mistake. (TW 49-50) 
Berkeley is not denying that there is such a thing as the visible retinal image. 
There is such a thing: it is what one sees when one looks into another per-
son's eye or into one's own using proper tools. Rather, his point is that it is 
the tangible retinal image, rather than the visible, which can be rightly said 
to be a sign of some other tangible object. This is why Berkeley grants here 
that the tangible retinal image resembles the tangible object that causes it. In 
granting this, he is allowing that the tangible retinal image represents the tan-
gible object. But in denying tangible retinal images to be "the proper imme-
diate objects of sight" Berkeley only dispels the puzzlement if he also thinks 
that the visible object, which he admits to be a sign of the tangible (although 
not without experience of conjunction of the two), to be only mistakenly 
compared in orientation to the tangible retinal image. That is, he has only 
offered a solution to the problem if he denies that tangible and visible objects 
can be oriented with respect to one another. So, he must be offering the fourth 
solution here. He has allowed that there is a sense in which both the visible 
object and the tangible retinal image are signs of the same thing: they are 
both signs of the tangible object from which light travels to the eye. But he 
denies that these two signs have any orientation properties with respect to 
each other. The only object that is oriented oppositely from the visible object 
is the visible retinal image but that object he denies to be a sign of the rele-
vant tangible object. 
Berkeley concludes his discussion in TVV with the following observation: 
Pictures, therefore, may be understood in a twofold sense, or as 
two kinds quite dissimilar and heterogeneous, the one consist-
ing of light, shade, and colours; the other not properly pictures, 
but images projected on the retina. Accordingly, for distinction, 
I shall call those pictures, and these images. The former are visi-
ble, and the peculiar objects of sight. The latter are so far other-
wise, that a man blind from his birth may perfectly imagine, 
understand, and comprehend them. (TW 51) 
Berkeley's point here is a trivial consequence of a view that he has already 
expounded at length: namely, the heterogeneity of the visible and the tangi-
ble. Every kind of object can be understood, for Berkeley, in this "twofold 
sense." Pictures are not special in this regard. But the reason Berkeley empha-
sizes the point here with respect to pictures in particular is that it is peculiarly 
relevant to the fourth solution: the mistake is in thinking that the retinal 
image and the visible object are pictures, representations, of one thing and, 
at the same time, that their orientation can be meaningfully compared. If 
they are both representations of the same thing-if we are speaking, that is, 
of the tangible retinal image-then they belong to different sense modalities 
and can't be meaningfully compared; if they belong to the same sense modal-
ity and can be meaningfully compared-if we are speaking, that is, of the 
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visible retinal image-then they aren't both representations of the same thing. 
Either way there is nothing puzzling about the orientation of the retinal image. 
III. 
In an important paper on this topic, Colin Turbayne marshals persuasive evi-
dence in favor of the claim that Berkeley considers his solution to the prob-
lem of retinal image inversion to be an important step in establishing the 
idealist conclusions for which he argues in Principles of Human Knowledge. 
In particular, according to Turbayne, Berkeley's solution to the problem of 
the inverted retinal image is supposed to show that "the proper objects of 
sight are not the images of external things."14 This claim is as striking and 
audacious as idealism itself. If reflection on retinal image orientation forces 
us to accept that perspectival visual images are not representations of real 
objects, then the problem of the retinal image is, indeed, a "knot" the solu-
tion to which shows us "the principal point in the whole optic theory" (TVV 
52). While I believe that Turbayne is absolutely right as to what Berkeley took 
the importance of the solution to the problem of the inverted retinal image 
to be, it is not clear from what Turbayne says of the solution itself that 
Berkeley had any legitimate reason to think this radical idealist conclusion 
to be implied by his solution to the problem. However, the conclusion of sec-
tion II places us in position to see why Berkeley should have thought this. 
Notice that none of the first three solutions to the problem leads to any-
thing like this audacious conclusion. Consider, tiJr instance, the second solu-
tion according to which there is nothing puzzling about the orientation of 
the retinal image since such puzzlement requires falsely taking visible objects 
either to be oriented with respect to one another or with respect to tangible 
objects. Acceptance of the claim that visible objects are not oriented either 
with respect to tangible or visible objects does not lead to the conclusion that 
"the proper objects of sight are not the images of external things." To reach 
that conclusion we would need the further claim that one thing is an image 
of another only if oriented with respect to it. But there is no reason to think 
Berkeley would accept this further claim, or that there is any reason to think 
it true. In fact, many forms of dualism involve rejection of just this claim: if 
thoughts about material things adhere in an immaterial substance then, plau-
sibly, they are not oriented with respect to the objects they represent since 
they are not properly located in space at all. 
However, the fourth solution to the problem, the solution attributed to 
Berkeley in section II, does indeed have the implication that visible objects 
are not properly (that is, taken independently of experience of conjunction 
with tangible objects) signs of external things. Imagine that they were. It 
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would follow that both the visible object one encounters and the visible reti-
nal image that co-occurs with it are representations of the same thing, namely, 
the "real" object. But then we would have the materials to make a puzzle for 
we would have two signs of the same thing that are oppositely oriented with 
respect to each other. Given how Berkeley, in the fourth solution, diagnoses 
the source of the puzzlement over the orientation of the retinal image, any-
one who believes the visible objects he encounters to be, independently of 
experience, signs of external things will find himself puzzled by retinal image 
orientation. But since we shouldn't be puzzled by this, we shouldn't accept 
that visible objects are signs of external things. 
Why does the conclusion here apply only to the proper objects of vision, 
the objects of vision considered independently of any tactile experience? That 
is, why can't Berkeley use his solution to the problem of the inverted retinal 
image to establish the stronger conclusion that no visible objects, not even 
those that have been found through experience to be conjoined with tangi-
ble objects, are signs of external things? The reason is that a visible object that 
has come through experience to be a sign of a tangible object does not rep-
resent that object by virtue of the same principles of representation accord-
ing to which a retinal image represents the object. Thus, the respective 
orientation of the retinal image and the visible object is no more puzzling 
than differences found across languages in the words used to represent the 
same things. It would not be puzzling to find that a pictogram in one lan-
guage and an inverted pictogram in another represent the same thing. Since 
the two languages have different principles of representation, there is no prob-
lem. Similarly, the fact that a visible object and a corresponding visible reti-
nal image are oppositely oriented is only puzzling if they are words in the 
same language, so to speak. But a visible object that represents a tangible as 
a result of experience of conjunction does not represent that tangible object 
for the same reasons that a particular retinal image does: the visible object 
represents the tangible because the two co-occur, but it is not that co-occur-
rence that accounts for the fact that the visible retinal image represents the 
object, but, instead, the co-occurrence of the visible retinal image and the same 
tangible object. The analogy to our use of mirrors is instructive: since I'm 
used to using it, the image in my rearview mirror represents the driver of the 
car behind me to be sitting on the left-hand side of his car, despite the fact 
that the image of the driver appears on the right-hand side of the image of 
the car; when I look over my shoulder, my visual experience represents the 
driver, again, to be sitting on the left-hand side of his car, although my visual 
image and the image in the mirror are oppositely oriented. Experience can 
teach us to employ different rules, depending on the kind of representation 
we encounter, in collecting the contents of representations. 
However, at this point there emerges an obstacle for JJerkeley, for why 
should we agree that the retinal image and the visible object we encounter 
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do not both accurately represent the same object? Why should we not insist, 
instead, that those two proper objects of vision are like words in different lan-
guages that represent the same thing accurately but which we shouldn't expect 
to share the same properties?15 Such a position undermines Berkeley's auda-
cious claim to the effect that dissolution of the problem of retinal image inver-
sion leads inexorably to an important part of idealism; it allows for dissolution 
of the problem in accordance with the diagnosis of the problem's basis pro-
vided by the fourth solution without acceptance of the idealist claim. However, 
the view on offer, according to which the two proper objects of vision repre-
sent the same thing but in virtue of different linguistic rules, as it were, 
encounters a serious problem of its own: there is no reason, other than a desire 
to avoid Berkeley's audacious idealist claim, to think that two visible objects 
could, just by virtue of their nature and independently of experience, repre-
sent the same orientation properties while being oriented oppositely. Imagine, 
for instance, being handed two photographs printed from the same negative, 
but in which the negative was flipped both horizontally and vertically between 
making the prints. If the two photographs represent the depicted scene as 
possessing the same orientation properties, then something must indicate 
that the one photograph and the other are to be interpreted according to dif-
ferent representational principles, like the two pictograms in two different 
languages; something must indicate that one, for instance, is to be read in the 
way we might read the orientation properties of an object while standing on 
one's head and looking at an image of it in a mirror, the other in the ordi-
nary way in which we read photographs. But what could possibly indicate 
this, except something external to the photographs themselves (such as knowl-
edge on the viewer's part of the original orientation of the subject)? The pic-
tures themselves do not tell the viewer which is to be interpreted in the normal 
way, and which is to be interpreted as an upside-down photograph of a mir-
ror image; taken by themselves, that is, the two photographs represent the 
depicted scene as possessing different orientation properties and thus both 
cannot be accurate. Similarly, to insist that the visible retinal image and the 
perceiver's perspectival visual experience represent the object as having the 
same orientation properties, but do so in virtue of different representational 
principles, is to insist on something which is, taken by itself, implausible. It 
is to attribute a greater capacity for representation to visual representations 
than they have, independently of experience. 
Berkeley cared about the problem of the inverted retinal image because 
he believed that an adequate diagnosis and dissolution of the puzzlement 
that we sometimes feel about it would lead inevitably to acceptance of the 
view that the visible objects that we encounter are part of the metaphysical 
fundament rather than part of the medium through which we learn about 
that fundament. What is mightily difficult is not accepting the fact of retinal 
image inversion-nothing easier; the mighty difficulty is in providing an ade-
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quate characterization of the root cause of the initial puzzlement that most 
people feel when confronted with the anatomical facts. What is it that we are 
commonsensically and falsely assuming about the functioning of our per-
ceptual mechanism that, at first anyway, seems to be in conflict with the fact 
of retinal image inversion? What we are assuming, if Berkeley is right, is that 
what we see represents something more, something that lies beyond the sphere 
of, at least, vision and, perhaps, beyond the sphere of all of our senses. If 
Berkeley is right, then along with that assumption comes inevitable puzzle-
ment of the sort to which not even a child should succumb. And, thus, with 
an adult's savvy about the nature of visual perception comes the acceptance 
of an important element in idealism. 
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in the main text, there is a way of understanding Berkeley's construal of !\s mistake under 
which the mistake legitimately leads to puzzlement regarding the orientation of B's reti-
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